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Denver International Airport: Lessons Learned 
C .  Daniel Prather 
"Xhe airport planner, who is required to anticipate conditions 10 to 15 years in the future, must often resort to 
guesswork " (322). 
Researching the evolution of Denver International Alrport was more than simply a project of interest. These three 
authors recognize the continuing growth in aviation demand and the need for expanding facilities to accommodate this 
demand. Indeed, this book was designed to assist major cities worldwide as they are forced to cope with this need for 
additional supply in airport facilities. In sum, "the need to build new airports and expand existing ones will continue to 
press communities to address many of the same difficult questions that Denver f a d  (ix). In this sense, this book is a 
resource for all airport managers and professors confronting the increasing aviation demands of the next millennium. 
Chapter one, entitled "The world's largest airport," points 
out that Denver International Anport (DM) is the largest 
segment of real estate in the world solely dedicated to 
commercial aviation. Prior to developing this 52 square mile 
facility, however, six alternate sites were evaluated. This 
chapter details the political struggle among municipal 
officials, airport officials, and citizens during consideration of 
alternative sites. After many campaigns both pro and con, an 
election was held on May 16, 1989, which resulted in a 63 
percent victory far the new airport. Although this vote was not 
legally required, City of Denver Mayor Pena decided he 
"could not deny citizens the right to vote on the largest public 
works project in the city's historyy' (16). Construction began 
on September 28, 1989, with the airport finally opening 
February 28, 1995. The entire project was finalized at $3.5 
billion over budget. 
Chapter two, "Three hubs to one: the folly of forecasting in 
the dynamic airline industry," attempts to answer questions 
such as (1) how are forecasts of passenger demand generated? 
(2) why are these so erroneous? (3) how have recent policy 
changes, such as airline deregulation, affected airport 
development? and (4) given the shortcomings of existing 
forecasting practices, what kind of planning process is the 
most effective? Specifically, the chapter points out that issues 
such as deregulation, globalization, capacity, and delay have 
made the practice of aviation forecasting a spotty effort at 
best. Ths however, should be no surprise to students of 
statistical forecasting methods. The numbers produced are 
only as accurate as the variables considered, and because of 
this, predicting the future, whether involving the stock market 
or airline passengers, is a complex endeavor. 
This is not to say that these inaccurate forecasts must simply 
be accepted, however. In fact, these inaccurate forecasts at 
Denver proved 'Wdly optimistic" (xii). In the late 1980s, the 
FAA projected that Denver would ultimately see 55 million 
passengers by 1995; the actual number was less than 31 
million. This, of course, played a role into how large the new 
airport needed to be, and in fact, if a new airport was even 
necessary. 
Completing chapter two is the first in a series of "lessons 
learned." These points are presented at the end of each 
remaining chapter to drive home points that should be learned 
from DM'S experiences. Some of the lessons learned from 
this chapter include (1) not relying exclusively on aviation 
forecasts; they will nearly always be wrong, (2) not 
overlooking alternative methods of resolving capacity 
problems, and (3) fully considering the role of airlines in any 
further forecasting exercises. 
Chapter three, "The politics of DIA's development," 
discusses an issue that is present in all public agencies. 
JAAER, Winter 1998 15 
1
Prather: Denver International Airport: Lessons Learned
Published by Scholarly Commons, 1998
Denver International Aivort 
Specifcally, the following questions are addressed: (1) How 
effective are existing mechanisms for public participation in 
the planning process? (2) What responsibility do the media, 
elected officials, and planners have to ensure that the public is 
accurately informed about the issues? and (3) How does a city 
secure cooperation with other relevant organizations in airport 
development or expansion? 
In answering these questions, this chapter presents a case- 
by-case analysis of each of the following actors involved in 
the process: elected officials, local businesspeople, the 
citizenry, and various interest groups. Regarding public 
participation, the authors list four levels at which public 
participation can take place: (1) ''tokenism" in which power 
resides with elected O M S ,  (2) "consultation," which allows 
citizens the opportunity to comment via public hearings, 
surveys, and advisory committees; however, officials still 
make the decisions, (3) "reconciliatory" in which there is a 
strong two-way flow of information between the decision- 
makers, the public, and various community-based groups; 
however, the governmental agency retains the decision- 
making power, and (4) the "participatory" model in which 
power is shared by the public and the government. This last 
model allows the public to participate in the actual decision- 
making process at the policy level. 
Some lessons learned include: (1) citizen education and 
participation is essential from the outset if public support is to 
be long-lived and democratic values respected, (2) the media 
must remain an independent source of reliable, unbiased 
information about major infi-cture issues facing their 
community, (3) local proponents or opponents must be 
unilied, well-financed, and posses politically astute leadership, 
and (4) opponents of airport expansion can play a trump card 
with the threat of environmental opposition. Regarding the 
second lesson, the authors candidly stated "had [the media] 
been more vigilant as the public's watchdog, the project 
would likely have been implemented far more successfully 
than it was" (134). 
Chapter four specifically analyzes the economic impact of 
airports. Indeed, airports have been recognized as possibly the 
single most important piece of irdkastructure cities and nations 
can build to improve their chances of success in global 
economic competition. However, the authors quickly argue 
that '"the economic impact argument alone cannot be used as 
the principal justification for building new airports" (140). In 
discussing the impact of these projects, a historical review of 
Denver is performed dating back to its founding in 1858. 
Current impacts are also discussed, such as the estimate that 
one in every ten jobs Colorado-wide is airport-related. The 
chapter also discusses competing airports, such as Colorado 
Springs and their hub airline, Western Pacific. In addition, 
local land-use impacts are evaluated, such as the one main 
entrance into DIA, Pena Boulevard. Further, the authors state 
"what now is open farmland or rangeland is expected to 
become the site of billions of dollars in residential and 
commercial development over the next 10 to 20 years" (171). 
Lessons learned include (1) airports are not a panacea for 
lagging economic development, (2) land-use planning around 
airports should be coordinated and consistent among affected 
jurisdictions, and (3) insurmountable barriers to residential 
development should be placed near airports. 
Chapter five, "Financing the field of dreams," is perhaps 
reminiscent of familiar megaprojects in the past. Whether an 
airport, or a dream, this project had to be financed. This 
chapter discusses methods by which both international and 
U.S. airports are financed. Indeed, the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) and the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) estimate that, worldwide, $250 
billion will be spent for airports between now and 2010 (1 83). 
Due to the magnitude of these projects and the continued 
declining federal funding, this chapter is of importance to 
many in the industry today. 
The chapter begins by discussing the financing process at 
airports worldwide. Bonds (both revenue and general 
obligation), underwriters, rating agencies, and privatization 
are a few of the concepts discussed in the first section of this 
chapter. The next section looks specifically at DIA's case. 
DIA was h c e d  with approximately $3.5 billion in bond 
sales, along with federal fimds, monies h m  the disposition of 
Stapleton, a capital fund, 1985 project accounf PFCs, and a 
civil aviation fuel tax. With this substantial amount of bonds 
outstanding, debt service expense for DIA climbed to $344.5 
million per year. This, even though revenues were projected 
at $43 1.8 million in 1995. It is obvious, therefore, that bonds 
make up a large portion of DIA's financing base and even 
more of their annual expenses. 
The next section of chapter five discusses the politics of 
underwriting. Denver received the dubious honor of earning 
the lowest grade ever assigned to the bonds of a major U.S. 
airport. This was due in part to continued opening delays, 
escalating change orders, and the infamous automated 
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baggage system. Speaking of the volatility of the airport itself, 
and thus the bonds' behavior, one analyst noted, "if you don't 
like volatility, you don't like these bonds" (2 12). Because of 
this volatility, complaints and lawsuits have resulted, one 
(Rabinowitz v. City of Denver et al. 1995) charging that " . . 
. [official DL4 bond statements] failed to fdly and adequately 
disclose the risks associated with investing in the Bonds" 
(214). These problems led the city auditor to remark, "I never 
dreamed that when the airport was completed that we would 
exchange construction workers for lawyers" (215). 
Another clear example of the politics associated with bond 
underwriting, appears when MarkAir, a bankrupt air carrier, 
requested a the-year, $30 million loan fiom the city prior to 
commencing operations in Denver. Upon hearing this, 
Moody's told Denver that if it approved this loan to MarkAir, 
the ratings on DIA's bonds would be dropped to junk bond 
status. This threat was s~ltFcient o bring negotiations to a halt 
even though the traveling public of Colorado might have 
benefited from a more competitive airline environment at 
DM. 
Lessons learned Itom this chapter appear to be common 
knowledge. They are as follows: (1) honesty is the best policy, 
(2) act ethically, (3) subject bond underwriters to the same 
competitive bidding process as other city contractors, and (4) 
keep the cornunity fully informed of all financial 
developments. 
Chapter six evaluates the site selection process. This, as all 
airport managers know, is one of the most Mcu l t  decisions 
concerning new airport development. Complex factors 
involved in this process include environmental constraints, 
noise, compatible land use, distance &om city center, and 
ground access. Regarding distance from city center, it should 
be noted that newer airports are always being built farther 
away from the city simply due to the lack of available land 
near the city. On that note, Denver is 24 miles from 
downtown. Stapleton was a mere 7 miles. 
This chapter also discusses the Environmental Impact 
Statement @IS) process. Noted environmental impacts 
produced by airports include noise, air quality, water quality, 
impacts on wildlife, and social impacts such as relocation of 
households. Interestingly enough, even though DM was built 
far way from the downtown, and on relatively vacant 
rangeland, 277 noise complaints were registered during the 
first week of DM'S operation. By December 2, 1995, DM 
had received a total 66,742 noise complaints, compared with 
cmly 43 1 at Stapleton during all of 1994. Several reasons for 
this astounding number are (1) that some residential areas 
were actually within the 65Ldn contour even though original 
projections indicated they would not be, (2) the final EIS was 
based on six runways, rather than the five that were built, and 
(3) each household making complaints is averaging nearly 20 
calls. In fact, ten familes account for one-fourth of all 
complaints (259). 
Lessons learned in chapter six address several aspects of the 
site selection process. They include locating the airport to 
minimize adverse noise impacts, developing and 
implementing noise mitigation procedures in consultation with 
affected publics, monitoring the validity of the noise impact 
forecasts, incorporating multi-modal ground access into the 
termma1 airport, developing a comprehensive intermodal and 
multi-modal transportation hub, air quality impact being 
considered for an entire region, and site selection processes 
that are open to the public. 
The next chapter, chapter seven, discusses airj?ort layout, 
design, and technologies. This third phase of an airport's 
master plan is broken down into four components: (1) airport 
layout (2) land use, (3) terminal area, and (4) airport access. 
The chapter begins by discussing the effects of airline 
deregubon on airport layout. Regarding DIA's master plan, 
it calls for 12 runways surrounding four (or five) center-field 
60-gate air side terminal buildings linked to a landside 
terminal building (with five modules at full build out) by a 
5100-foot underground train. When ultimately built out 
(sometime after the year 2020), DIA's capacity would be 1 10 
million passengers (compared with about 3 1 million in 1995) 
and 1.23 million operations annually. This, the text notes, is 
more capacity than any other airport in the world (291). 
Some interestmg points about DM include the following: (1) 
to flatten the site of DIA, about 110 d o n  cubic yards of 
earth were moved, which is about one-third the amount moved 
to build the Panama Canal, (2) the FAA reconfigured 240,000 
square miles of navigable airspace to accommodate the flight 
paths of the new airport; (3) even with high density altitude, 
Asia will be within reach from Denver once the new 16,000 
feet mway is built; (4) the 327-foot FAA control tower is the 
tallest in the world; (5) no runways intersect; and (6) DL4 is 
one of only four airports in the U.S. with an advanced airport 
lighting system. Technologies discussed include the radar, 
communications system, people movers, baggage system, 
security, aud those technologies implemented to combat snow 
JAAER, Winter 1998 
3
Prather: Denver International Airport: Lessons Learned
Publis ed by Scholarly Commons, 1998
Denver International Aivport 
and ice problems. 
One situation that results in problems and complaints at DIA 
is the fact that even though United Airlines utilizes DIA as a 
hub airport, the airport itself sees Origin and Destination 
traff~c of 58 percent, with connecting tr&c of 42 percent. 
Therefore, this airport is being forced to accommodate both 
O&D and transfer passengers. This, as one can imagine, is 
difficult to accomplish. For these reasons, the following 
conflicts have been noted: (1) baggage claim level is 
accessible only to public transport and not private autos, (2) 
to get fiom the parking garage to the drop-off or pick-up 
levels, or vice versa, automobiles must drive three miles 
around to return to the terminal area, (3) the public accessed 
the airport during the first year without the convenience of a 
gas station on the 12-mile Pena Boulevard, (4) with only two 
lanes in each direction, Pena Boulevard can become quite 
congested, and (5) no snow fences were originally built to 
protect the boulevard from blowing snow. The chapter 
continues by discussing several technological problems 
encountered during the first year of DIA's operation and how 
similar problems are being handled at other new airports 
throughout the world. 
In addition, this chapter delves into the many technological 
breakthroughs attempted at DIA. As a result of this, many 
lessons were learned: (1) acquire as much land as possible at 
the outset, (2) design the airfield first, (3) decisions made to 
enhance hubbing efficiency may compromise 0&D 
convenience, (4) design terminals and concourses in modular 
f m  with sufficient reserved space to allow future expansion, 
(5) get the principal airline tenants and the national 
government involved early in the design process, (6) 
incoprate security concerns into airport planning and design 
early, (7) locate the airport to minimize adverse noise impacts, 
(8) incoqxmte mass transit into the terminal design, (9) adopt 
a proven technology for critical systems (keep it simple, 
stupid), and (10) set aside ample time to test-run the 
technology. 
Chapter eight focuses on the architecture and aesthetics of 
the airport. First, the white multi-peaked roof is the initial 
impression one has when driving to the airport. This design 
has been praised by some, such as " . . . [the fabric peaks] 
create a mood of excitement and adventure that is inseparable 
f h n  travel but virtually absent from modern airports" (36 I), 
and criticized by others, such as 
" . . . [it looks like] a circus tent draped over a big hedgehog" 
(361). The terminal itself covers 3.5 million square feet - the 
equivalent of 35 football fields. The parking garages were 
"merc* tucked below the roof line as not to obstruct the 
view fiom the west side of the departure level" (372). From 
the main observation deck however, the view of most of the 
mountains (with the exception of Pike's Peak) is  obstructed by 
a highway viaduct leading up to the top level. And the latter, 
according to one critic, is "unforgivable' (373). 
Due to a demand by Continental Airlines' Frank Lorenzo, the 
main terminal and Concourse " A  are connected by the only 
bridge crossing an active airport taxiway in the world. In 
addition, Denver decided to incorporate artwork into the 
termmal to showcase local & and the surrounding region. 
Although the authors note that beauty is in the eye of the 
beholder, one critic found only "[flive truly first-rate pieces 
fiom a budget of more than $7 million" (380). Prior to the 
conclusion of this chapter, the authors also focus on 
architecture and aesthetics of other major international 
airports. Some lessons learned fiom this chapter include: (1) 
art should be incorporated into the budget, (2) the art should 
reflect the unique cultural heritage and natural beauty of the 
region served by the airport, and (3) tasteful art should be 
selected by art experts, with the public then choosing from a 
group of finalists. 
Chapter nine, "How did a $1.5 billion airport become a $5.3 
billion airport?", summarizes the many dSiculties 
encountered in building DIA, which resulted in substantial 
delays and massive cost overmns. The authors quickly point 
out that Denver is similar to megaproject peers in that 
megaprojects cost, on average, 90 to 150 percent more than 
their ori@ estimates. Along these lines, the authors present 
a conceptual model of cost growth that defines four basic 
factors: (1) cost-estimating errors, (2) faulty project 
execution, (3) changes in project, and (4) changes in project 
macro-environment. Regarding cost, in comparative terms, 
Stapleton cost less than $6 per passenger, whereas DIA cost 
over $18 per passenger. This led then Colorado governor Roy 
Romer to declare, "Had somebody told me that the per- 
passenger cost was going to be $18, I would not have 
supported the airport . . . . They went Cadillac" (410). 
Regarding the routmg of 12-mile Pena Boulevard, the reason 
it is shaped as an inverted "I," rather than a straight diagonal 
line is a mystery. In fact, if a modest two miles had been 
shaved off the driving distance, auto emissions would have 
been reduced by more than one million kilograms of carbon 
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monoxide annually, thus saving two million gallons of 
gasoline per year (4 13). 
Faulty project execution resulted form the fast-track 
approach. The City teamed with Greiner/Momson Knudsen, 
a joint venture, to coordinate and ensure the quality of 61 
design contracts, 134 construction contractors, and more than 
2,000 subcontractors (417). This led one auditor to state "that 
DIA is a project out of control and without leadership" (41 8). 
Regarding design changes, the dominant hub carriers at 
Stapleton, at first, had no support for a new airport that may 
give rise to a new, competitive hub airline. However, once 
they agreed, they demanded - and received - significant and 
expensive design changes. Mayor Webb, who was eager to 
f5is.h the new airport, readily acceded to their demands. As a 
result, Continental's changes added $200 million to DIA's 
costs, while United added $600 million. Continental, in the 
meantime, fell into Chapter 1 1 bankruptcy. Ultimately, the 
City realized that Continental would occupy only 3 or 4 gates 
of a 20 gate concourse that had been built specifically for it. 
Page 430 of the text presents a very sobering chart displaying 
the amount of change orders as opening day drew closer. The 
most expensive, issued in March 1994, was a change order in 
the amount of $535 million. 
The next section in this chapter discusses the "baggage 
system fimn hell." Indeed, with the exception of this system, 
the airport may have opened one year earlier. Although many 
know of the problems with this system, many don't know that 
United actually demanded it; therefore, it was not in the 
original specifications for the airport. There were two 
conditions for this project which successful bidders had to 
adhk to: (1) the system had to be complete in 26 months and 
(2) it had to move 1,000 bags per minute. Two bids were 
submitted and both were rejected due to bulky equipment and 
untimely project completion. The City then turned to BAE 
Automated Systems, Inc., which agreed to complete the 
system in two years, provided it had unlimited access to the 
facility. However, delays resulted due to the City's failure to 
allow primary and expeditious access to BAE. Desperate to 
open the airport, the City signed away its rights to sue BAE 
for producing a dysfunctional baggage system by the 
scheduled opening date. Further, another company was 
commissioned to build a backup system comprised of 
com~eym belts and natural gas-fueled tugs and carts. In all, the 
City spent nearly $300 million for baggage handling for an 
airport with fewer than 90 gates. 
The next section candidly discusses problems with the 
management at DIA. From the governor on down, it seems 
that very few escape the authors' criticism. With section 
headings such as "Imprudent cost-cutting," "Ethics: Greed, 
cronyism, and revolving doors," and "Send lawyers, guns, and 
money," it is obvious that many unethical practices were 
commonplace at DM and the City. Nonetheless, the 
unavoidable problems probably produce empathy by some in 
the industry. Indeed, "DIA was planned for three major hub 
airlines (United, Continental, and Frontier), built for two 
(United and Continental), and is occupied by only one 
(united)" (455). 
Many lessons were also learned in chapter nine. Some of 
these include: (1) make every effort to get the principal 
tenants on board early in the planning and design process to 
minimize scope and design changes, (2) resist major scope 
changes after construction has begun, and if they must be 
made, amend the timetable for opening the airport 
accordingly, (3) install backup systems, (4) depoliticize the 
contractiug process, and (5) promulgate a vigorous regime of 
ethical regulation and enforce it. 
Chapter ten, "Auport planning theory in perspective," 
focuses on implications for those interested specifically in 
airport projects and generally in megaproject planning and 
decision-making. This chapter begins by presenting various 
theories decision-making that have been advanced in the past. 
The authors point out that "at best, the rational comprehensive 
model represents only an ideal form of how planning and 
decision-making is supposed to occur7' (472). The authors 
then delve into the character of Denver's airport planuing 
process. From problem conceptualization to project 
implementation, all five stages of this process are analyzed. 
The chapter then moves into a more thorough discussion of 
these processes and models. In sum, the authors suggest that 
the planning of airports and other magaprojects be 
approached from a paradigm that recognizes the great 
uncertainties that are inherent in such endeavors. In their 
words, "one must be prepared to deal with the totally 
unexpected" (485). Lessons learned from this chapter include 
the following: (1) efficiency should not be defined in narrow 
economic terms, (2) develop mechanisms to promote 
community consensus on critical choices, (3) develop 
arrangements to force careful public discussions of the 
project's assumptions, (4) develop a new approach to airport 
planning that recognizes the importance of maintaining 
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flexibihty throughout the process, and (5) promote the 
development of organizations that are prepared and equipped 
to deal with risks and uncertainties. 
The final chapter of this book, entitled "What have we 
leamedr', presents many facts which all airport planners and 
managers should review. In m e r i n g  the question, "Why did 
DIA cost so much?", the following points are presented: (1) 
Mayor Pena's decision to break the airport into a large 
number of small contracts, (2) the excessive time consumed 
between the decision to build and the land acquisition, (3) 
Mayor Pena's decision to sign numerable contracts on the eve 
of his departure to put the project beyond the "point of no 
return,'' (4) Mayor Webb's capitulation to the airlines' belated 
demands for massive scope changes, (5) Webb's decision to 
expand the automated baggage system beyond United's 
Concourse B to cover all three concourses, (6) Webb's focus 
on securing contracts for his fiiends and supporters, rather 
than focusing on more crucial airport issues, and (7) the 
failure of the federal government to provide adequate 
oversight (500-0 1). 
Turning to the fact that no new major airports (prior to DIA) 
have been buitt in the U.S. in two decades, the authors attempt 
to explain how Denver was able to do it. They outline three 
major factors: (1) growth impetus, which grew out of the 
desire to reinvigorate the local economy in the 1980s, (2) 
willing politicians, such as the mayor and governor who saw 
a new airport a s  a way to achieve their political goals while at 
the same time alleviating the worsening problems of capacity 
and noise at Stapleton, and (3) favorable external 
c i r c ~ c e s ,  such as Stapleton being recognized as a key 
bottleneck and the subsequent strong federal support, 
disorganized airlines who opposed the new airport, and the 
medq interest pups, and general public who were unwilling 
or unable to halt the project. 
The hl list of lessons learned somewhat summarizes many 
of the concepts learned throughout the text and include the 
following: (1) despite all obstacles, a major American city 
with determined political leadership, a strong growth 
coalition, and a favorable economic environment can build a 
transportation, (5) don't believe the overly optimistic 
projections of demand and cost, (6) airline deregulation has 
created tremendous uncertainty for airport planners, (7) the 
federal government should take a stronger role in protecting 
competitors and consumers from the predatory and 
monopolistic pricing and other practices, respectively, of 
dominant airlines at concentrated hub airports, (8) politicians 
are essential for building political consensus, but they often 
feel compelled to reward their supporters, (9) aflkmative 
action can be used to mask political cronyism, (10) new 
approaches to airport design and implementation are required, 
(1 1) intermodal tramportation access, while carefully planned 
in foreign countries, is unfortunately a low priority in the U.S., 
and (12) federal and local governments should help facilitate 
airport growth and development and the more efficient use of 
existing airway and airport capacity. 
To smnmarize, the book by Dempsey, Goetz, and Szyliowicz 
takes a profound look on the effects of airport development in 
the U.S. Rather than simply analyzing the problems and 
successes experienced by DIA since its inception, these 
auhm take a longitudinal look at the City of Denver from its 
founding until tbe present. Stapleton w o r t  is discussed quite 
heavily as this airport and its capacity constraints were the 
impetus in the decision to build DIA. 
I believe this book is an extremely informative aid for 
students, professors, and professionals in this industry. It is 
a large text and can become rather technical at times, but 
students and professors alike will find the events discussed in 
this book quite informative. It is indeed a must-read for 
academicians interested in increasing their knowledge about 
real-world examples of the airport business. Learning from 
past practice is but one way in which the airport industry will 
continue to grow and prosper in the coming miUenium.0 
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